The race to meet vital needs following sudden onset disasters leads response organizations to establish stockpiles of inventory that can be deployed immediately, without needing to rely on suppliers. These government or non-government organizations dynamically make stockpile decisions in isolation, and they do so without empirical metrics on how the stock will improve the response effort. To address these issues we develop a quantitative model to analyze stockpile capacity, propose metrics based on model results to assess decisions over time, and normalize the metrics as the basis for a sector-wide index of combined capacity. To guide the development of our analytical assessment approach, we utilize comprehensive information on global stock including publicly available data on inventory stored by various organizations in United Nations facilities and data that organizations provide to the UN on their own stockpiles. In addition, our empirical study offers practical insights regarding the current humanitarian response capabilities and strategies. We show that significant improvement in terms of time and cost can be achieved by reallocating the inventory of several critical items currently in the system and coordinating among the organizations.
Introduction
The capability to rapidly deploy life-saving commodities in response to natural disasters is vital.
Government and non-government organizations have sought to improve response capacity by procuring larger stockpiles of critical commodities and pre-positioning them in various locations prior to disaster events. In addition, the private sector is increasingly making commitments to donate commodities following a disaster, which effectively adds to the stockpile. While the efforts of numerous organizations to increase stockpiles certainly improve capacity, the overall impact of larger and more dispersed stock deployment on humanitarian response is difficult to assess.
Our research seeks to address two issues in response capacity assessment: (1) the fragmented approach to establishing stockpiles makes it difficult to consider the combined capacity, and (2) the humanitarian sector lacks models and metrics to assess the quality of the stock positions over time.
To address these issues we develop a quantitative model to analyze stockpile capacity, propose metrics based on model results to assess decisions over time, and normalize the metrics as the basis for a sector-wide index of combined capacity.
Previous models for humanitarian prepositioning and stockpiling have focused on determining optimal strategies for facility location and stock deployment. Our modeling objectives differ from Article submitted to Journal for Peer Review these efforts in two aspects. First, we do not emphasize the stockpile location decision. Often humanitarian warehouse facilities are already established or determined by the donor that subsidizes the effort. Thus, we focus on allocation of stock across a set of given locations. Second, we do not seek to prescribe optimal solutions, but rather to measure the quality of current and alternate strategies compared with optimality. Like the previous approaches, we use a two-stage stochastic linear program (LP) to determine optimality based on detailed forecasts of humanitarian needs.
Next, we develop response capacity metrics that assess stockpile decisions based on robust data provided by the stochastic model. The metrics consider the overall capacity of stocks to meet the needs of the affected population and the quality of stock allocation considering time and cost for deployment to disaster locations. These metrics can be utilized by organizations to evaluate strategies such as global stock level, by considering the marginal value of investment, and stock allocation, by considering the marginal value of repositioning. The model enables robust measurement considering aspects such as cutoff times for delivering aid and seasonality of natural disasters throughout the year. In addition to individual metrics, we can develop the efficient frontier for stock deployment considering the primary objectives of minimizing response time and transportation cost.
Finally, we normalize these metrics and propose an initial sector-wide Response Capacity Index (RCI) that considers stock deployment decisions across organizations. The index should be updated regularly and its results be made available publicly. The RCI can be used as a dynamic managerial tool by organizations seeking to deploy resources that address gaps in the combined capacity.
Donors can use it to assess investment strategies. It also offers transparency and accountability to the public regarding resources established for their benefit. Much like industry benchmarking efforts, we expect that the value of dynamic information on combined capacity is sufficient incentive for organizations to share data on a regular basis. We test our model, metrics, and index with extensive data on commodity stock levels provided by the United Nations (UN). The data include stock in global facilities managed by the UN and by organizations that shared their data with the UN. These data provide the most accurate picture of commodities established to respond to disasters anywhere in the world. Thus, in addition to introducing a new approach to better assess capacity, our empirically grounded modeling work offers practical insights regarding the current humanitarian response capabilities and strategies.
Our results show that significant improvement can be achieved simply through reallocating the current inventories across depots: the current allocation takes 14% longer and costs 29% more on average than the respective optimal allocation. We also learn which locations are more important with different levels of stock and at different times of the year. Dubai is one of the most important depots when inventory levels are low; Subang, Malaysia, becomes increasingly important as inventory levels increase due in part to the large disasters that strike the Pacific region. Results help build new intuition, such as Stockholm serving as a useful depot for blankets in the summer due to its relatively short flight paths to Asia. Dual variables quantify the value for decision makers, in time or cost saved, of shifting stock to better locations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the humanitarian context that motivates this research in section 2. In section 3 we discuss the relevant literature, specifically related to stochastic optimization in pre-positioning supplies and indices in the realms of logistics and disasters. We introduce our analytical approach and stochastic LPs in section 4, followed by the metrics we propose based on model outputs. The empirical data for our study are presented in section 5, including the demand, supply, delivery times and costs, and commodity specifics such as people-served-per-item and weight. Section 6 presents the results of utilizing the data in section 5 as inputs into the models in section 4. We outline how the resulting metrics might provide the foundation for an index in section 7. Finally, section 8 concludes the paper.
Context and Motivation
Immediately following a disaster that outpaces community coping mechanisms, various outside organizations rush to provide life-saving commodities to meet health, water, food, shelter, or other needs for the affected population. The race to meet urgent needs relies on commodity stocks that have already been prepositioned by these organizations, which could include government (local, regional, national, or foreign), non-government (NGO), military, or private sectors. The stock for this initial deployment could be centralized or deployed across several locations. For large-scale and/or urgent crises, organizations may choose to utilize several stock locations and incur the additional cost of shipping farther to meet needs. In most cases, this initial stock is intended to meet human needs within the first few days, followed by replenishment from strategic suppliers based on assessments of need in the affected community. Hence, the initial push is typically transported by air unless ground transportation offers a 1-2 day transit time from a nearby stocking point; sea shipping is only used for replenishment.
Poor humanitarian response performance to a widely publicized event pushes organizations to take tangible actions; often this results in increasing the size and/or number of locations for critical commodity stockpiles (typically these are skewed toward the nature of the recent event and do not consider broader risks). On the other hand, constrained fundraising and/or expiration of stockpiled items pushes organizations to reduce stock. These continual adjustments occur across a very fragmented humanitarian sector with numerous NGOs and government agencies independently taking actions for the same population. The fragmented nature of the sector and limited transparency about immediate response capacity makes it difficult to assess the level of preparedness for a region.
Both feast and famine have negative outcomes: overcapacity leads to material convergence that stresses bottleneck resources following a disaster or to product expiry if there are few disasters requiring the stock; undercapacity leads to unmet needs in a large crisis.
Our research is motivated by these shortcomings. First, rather than address the decision making for a particular organization, we aim to facilitate sector wide response capacity planning by considering combined resources. Six United Nations Humanitarian Response Depots (UNHRDs) around the world Accra, Brindisi, Dubai, Las Palmas, Panama, and Subang offer space for government and non-governmental organizations to stockpile disaster relief supplies. These services are offered at no-cost or on a cost-recovery basis. In addition, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) manages a "Global Mapping of Emergency Stockpiles" to track items stocked by various organizations in their own facilities. In OCHA's own words (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2014a): "It provides a single-entry interface to map the capacities and resources of humanitarian actors to respond to the needs of affected populations in case of emergency. It is a central platform that places increased emphasis on 'who has what were' by region, sector, organization and/or organization type." Participation is voluntary and each organization maintains its own data. As such, it does not reflect all the items available to deploy by the global disaster relief community and it may not be current. However, as far as we know, it is the most comprehensive and accurate database describing global stockpiles. These UN sources provide the best data to represent combined capacity.
Second, instead of basing decisions on recent events and short memories, we aim to assess capacity on a broader base of information. We assess stockpile capacity considering sudden onset disasters and epidemics going back more than two decades. The Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) manages the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) that records data on the occurrence and effects of over 18,000 mass disasters in the world from 1900 to present (Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters 2014). Despite the limitations of any database with the objective of recording details related to every disaster that occurs (Guha-Sapir and Below 2006), this database is recognized as the best of its kind and has been utilized by many other researchers working in similar domains (Peduzzi et al. 2009 , Duran et al. 2011 . As our research is not focused on developing forecasts, our study assumes a future that is similar to the past; more specifically, we assume that each disaster recorded between 1990 until the summer of 2013 has an equal chance of occurring again. Beyond this study, our modeling framework generalizes to consider any proposed disaster forecast.
Our analytical assessment approach -including the model, metrics, and index -is developed in the context of these data. Our empirical study also demonstrates the usefulness of considering combined resources and a broad base of disaster events in planning humanitarian response capacity.
Literature Review
Our work is mainly related to two streams of literature. The first stream utilizes stochastic optimization to pre-position supplies for disasters. The second stream defines indices in the realms of logistics as well as disaster vulnerability and preparedness.
The set of metrics and tools we develop is based on a two-stage stochastic linear program. Several authors have used this type of model to optimize placement of inventory in order to respond to disasters. Many of these models determine where to place inventory in the first stage in order to optimize the response in the second stage. The second stage of these stochastic linear programs is often represented by a set of disaster scenarios. The paper most related to our work is that of Duran et al. (2011) . The authors work with CARE International to decide which depots to open and how much to store in each, with the objective of minimizing average time to respond to a disaster with a C-130 aircraft. Similar to this work, they utilize Em-Dat data (Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (2014)) in their scenario generation, measuring the total affected population for each disaster. They allow multiple disasters to occur within the replenishment lead time (so that a scenario may include more than one disaster). While they consider factors that we omit (multiple disasters, need for items based on disaster type, etc.), we consider factors they omit, such as transportation by truck and transportation costs in general (in addition to time); we also use the results of the stochastic linear program to develop a normalized set of metrics, as opposed to using it solely to determine where to place items. Other work in this area includes the following papers. de Brito Junior et al. (2013) develop a model that minimizes unmet demand as well as costs, and that takes into account donations based on media response. They apply their model to scenarios in Brazil. In Mete and Zabinsky (2010) , the authors analyze where to place supplies in Seattle in order to respond to possible earthquakes. They take into account possible road closures as well as the traffic situation (rush-hour, weekend, weekday). They minimize multiple objectives of cost/time and unmet demand, whose relative weights are determined by a tuning parameter. Klibi et al. (2013) develop richer sets of scenarios that account for where the disaster is, how it unfolds over time to neighboring regions, what the demand is, how vendor capacity may be limited, and how depots may be inaccessible. Because the complexity associated with the richer set of demand scenarios, the authors use Monte Carlo simulation to generate sample paths. Especially, de Brito Junior et al. (2013) and Klibi et al. (2013) have excellent literature reviews. Salmern and Apte (2010) propose a multi-objective stochastic optimization problem that dictates how best to allocate a budget in order to minimize casualties. In Hong et al. (2015) , the authors formulate a stochastic program that takes into account reliability; probabilistic constraints are included that ensure commodities can be delivered with high probability. Beyond the above literature, there has been much work in stochastic programming for general operations problems outside of disaster relief. See, for example, Shapiro et al. (2014) for an introduction to stochastic programming.
The second stream of literature related to our work consists of papers that define indices. Within this stream, we highlight indices developed for the logistics community and indices developed for the disaster relief community. Several indices developed for the logistics community are created by international organizations such as the World Bank. Arvis and Shepherd (2011) develop an air connectivity index based on gravity model theory from economics. Hoffmann (2012) develop an index to measure port performance: the Liner Shipping Connectivity Index (LSCI). This index is based on the normalized average of five components. Lastly, the Logistics Performance Index (Arvis et al. (2014) ) is based on survey results of freight forwarders. From the questions on the survey, Principle Component Analysis (PCA) is used to weigh the survey question responses into a single index number. Our work adds to the logistics index literature by using linear programming as an analytical tool for metrics that form an index. Acimovic and Graves (2015) use a normalized (non-stochastic) linear program to develop an inventory balance metric for an online retailer. Some of our work is based on that balance metric. However, we account for demand stochasticity, which is not included in Acimovic and Graves (2015).
Many authors have written papers describing indices related to disaster preparedness and vulnerability. Simpson and Katirai (2006) provide an excellent overview of these indices, describing many of them in detail in their appendix. Many of these indices measure risk to different communities, where risk might be some combination of vulnerability and response. For instance, Davidson and Lambert (2001) develop a multiplicative index that has two variants: measuring economic risk and measuring life risk. The index includes: hazard, exposure, vulnerability, and response. The response factor includes: percent of the country detached from the mainland, number of shelters available, evacuation clearance time, percent expected to evacuate, population density, city layout (grid or not), number of hospital beds per 100,000 people, number of physicians per 100,000 people, and per capita state gross product. The weights of these components in determining the response factor are found through the analytical hierarhcical process (AHP (2014)) for a regression model that predicts total persons killed based on disaster type, gross domestic product (GDP), number of people living in watersheds (for floods), percent of country's land that is arable (for droughts), and others. This is combined with population levels and disaster frequency to define overall risk per country.
Many of the indices in this stream are based on economics models. They utilize PCA, regression, or simple or weighted averages of objective and subjective measures. In contrast to this, we develop a set of objective metrics based partially on the output of linear programming models.
In the disaster response literature, stochastic linear programming has been used to decide where to position items, and logistics and disaster indices have been based on economics or averaging models. We contribute to the literature by applying the techniques of stochastic linear programming in the development of normalized, useful, objective metrics. It is our hope to build upon these metrics and further develop our preliminary index with the ongoing help and feedback from the disaster response community.
Analytical approach
Our analytical approach is based on a stochastic linear program and various metrics based on model results. They are described in detail below.
Formulation of the stochastic linear program
One of the building blocks for the set of metrics and the index is a scenario-based stochastic linear program (LP). The stochastic LP has two stages. Depending on whether we are utilizing actual or optimal inventory allocations, the first stage merely records the allocation of inventory or determines where to place inventory. The second stage is a transportation problem that allocates the resulting supply to demand, where the demand occurs at a single disaster node in each scenario.
The stochastic LP minimizes either the total expected time or cost to deliver the items from the supply nodes to the disaster locations across the scenarios.
Some of the output elements we utilize from this stochastic LP are the objective value, normalized objective value, and dual variables.
We first define parameters and variables that the stochastic LP uses. A dummy supply node is employed in order to satisfy demand for disasters when the need exceeds what is on-hand in the depots. We also include a delivery deadline parameter θ in order to examine only those solutions able to serve beneficiaries within a given time window.
I i − Set of all depots and warehouses except the dummy node i W − The dummy supply node
− Set of all depots including dummy node K k − Set of possible disaster scenarios J j − Set of possible disaster locations M m − Set of disaster types N n − Set of line items R r − Set of transportation modes c ijnr − Cost in dollars to transport a single item n from i to j via mode r τ ijr − Time to ship a single item from i to j via mode r (item independent) c W (τ W ) − The cost (time) from the dummy supply node to a disaster
S jmnt − The domestic/local capacity to respond to a disaster in location j of type m at period t for item n X − The inventory vector dictating how many items are stored at each depot i. X i 's are the elements of this vector. χ ∈ N − Starting inventory in the system as a whole, not including the dummy node T AP k − Total Affected Population in scenario k β jmnt − Factor converting number of people affected into the demand for item n at location j at time t for disaster type m
− Actual demand for item n for disaster k y k inr − Decision variable for how much of n to send from i to the disaster in scenario k via mode r. (Note we have n in the subscript, but for now we decompose the problem by item, so it is redundant) X − The |I| dimensional vector of starting inventory in each supply node. Its elements are X i . (Depending on the formulation, this may be and input by the user or a decision variable θ − Delivery deadline: if θ < ∞, arcs whose τ ijr > θ are removed, for both cost and time objectives.
The stochastic LP formulation for minimizing time is (note: the LP that minimizes cost is analagous):
We recognize that one could solve the above problem without a stochastic LP, namely, because the only decision variables are how much to ship from each depot to each disaster and because we assume there is only one location affected per scenario. However, keeping it in the form of a linear program maintains flexibility if more than one disaster were to be considered per scenario, allows us to calculate dual variables easily, and lends itself the the following formulation in which we calculate the optimal allocation of inventory. The formulation that optimizes inventory allocation is very similar, with X as a decision variable, and with an additional constraint to ensure the sum of the supply is equal to χ.
We define the objective values with the dummy costs subtracted as:
where the y
's are fixed as the respective solutions to the above LPs.
Metrics derived from the stochastic LPs
The solutions to the stochastic LPs provide several useful operational metrics. We first list and define the metrics we believe are the most useful. We then describe each one separately.
Note that we suppress the item subscript n in the definitions. Additionally, the dummy value τ W can be replaced by c W if cost is being minimized/measured instead of time.
Dual variable for constraint (1c) for depot i and disaster k for actual allocation LP
To calculate Π requires solving the LP with the optimal inventory allocation, (2a). To calculate the π i 's requires solving the LP with the actual inventory allocation (1a). To calculate ∆ requires solving both LPs. The metrics µ , γ, and δ are the same for both LPs unless θ < ∞, in which case two versions must be calculated for each metric. We also note that µ, µ , γ, and δ can easily be calculated without solving any LPs. The stochastic LPs are most useful in calculating Π , π i , and ∆.
4.2.1. The balance metric: ∆ The balance metric ∆ is similar to the deterministic version reported in Acimovic and Graves (2015), which was utilized for an online retailer. The metric is intended to measure whether a given amount of inventory is generally in the correct place or not.
More specifically, it estimates how far out of balance the actual allocation of inventory is relative to the optimal.
We note a few properties of this balance metric:
1. It is an approximation of the fractional increase in cost (time) to serve beneficiaries given that one's inventory is allocated as it actually is as opposed to being allocated optimally. As such, if inventory should be in Dubai, but it is actually half way around the world in Panama, the metric will suffer. However, if the inventory should be in Subang, and it is actually less than an hour away in Kuala Lumpur, the balance metric value will not change substantially.
2. The optimal value is 1. Anything greater than 1 is considered out-of-balance.
3. It is not strongly affected by abnormally large disasters in the dataset, i.e., it is relatively robust to outliers. Often, the largest disasters in the set of scenarios (derived from the historical dataset) far exceed the on-hand supply for any item. The objective functions and solutions of the LPs above in section 4.1 depend only on those people who are able to be served by the onhand inventory. People affected by a disaster who cannot be served by the current inventory due to a lack of supply have no bearing on the optimal allocation. Thus, if an item can serve only 1,000 people, then the optimal allocation, the time-to-serve those able to be served, and other output metrics will be identical whether the largest disaster across the scenarios affects 1,000 people or 10,000,000 people.
4. The metric is affected by which depots are considered. If a new depot is opened in a disaster hotspot and no inventory is actually moved there, the balance metric will increase (because V OP T (χ, n) will decrease). In this sense, operational managers can be alerted to the fact that the inventory is out-of-balance given the new depot.
Fraction served (λ) and fraction of disasters covered (δ) λ represents the frac-
tion of the weighted average of demand met, where the weights are derived from the scenario probabilities. This value gives a sense as to whether the inventory of items stored in the depots in total is appropriate. It does not depend on how the items are allocated among the depots (unless the demand deadline θ < ∞). We note that it can be influenced by very large disasters. The inclusion of a disaster scenario affecting tens or hundreds of millions of people will have a significant impact on µ, the denominator in the fraction that defines λ. Thus, these values in general may appear low, and must be interpreted with this in mind.
δ, on the other hand, is relatively robust to outliers. If there are only 1000 items in stock of an item, then whether an unserved disaster affects 1001 or 10,000,000 people is irrelevant in the calculation of δ. This robustness comes at the cost of not conveying the magnitude of the disasters that go unserved. δ provides different information from λ, and the two together can help operational managers understand the adequacy of the total inventory level.
Time per unit delivered
The value φ represents the average time (cost) to deliver one unit to a beneficiary from a depot. This will, of course, not be equal to the actual time to deliver an item (which would be stochastic itself and would depend on specific factors such as plane availability and weather), but rather the time from the depot to the capital of the affected country as calculated using the assumptions and data described below in section 5.3. Even though this number should not be used to estimate how long it will take for supplies to arrive at a disaster site, it can provide valuable and objective information when comparing scenarios and strategies with each other.
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Dual variables
The increase in total expected time (cost) to serve beneficiaries if an additional unit were added to depot i can be estimated by the adjusted dual variables (π i ) for the stochastic LP that utilizes actual inventory allocations (corresponding to constraints (1c)). We adjust the sum of the original dual variables k π k i because they are dependent on the choice of the dummy value τ W (c W ), which is rather arbitrary. That is, k π k i reflects the change in the objective value due to using the dummy node less often and due to the change in total time (cost) to ship items to beneficiaries from non-dummy node i. The adjusted dual values π i add back in the dummy cost multiplied by the fraction of scenarios using the dummy node (1 − δ). An additional unit of an item in the actual system at depot i would alleviate a shipment from the dummy node in those disasters that are currently utilizing the dummy node. Thus, the adjusted dual variable excludes the impact an additional unit has on the reliance of the system on the dummy node, and includes only the impact an additional unit has on the realized time (cost) for those beneficiaries able to be served.
The value of π i may be positive or negative. Additionally, the magnitude may be comparable to the time (cost) to ship one item or it may be considerably less due to the fact that the additional unit may not be utilized very often. (Note that the dual value reflects the impact on the objective function, which is an expectation, and it is not conditional on the additional unit being utilized).
For instance, if one were to add a bucket to the current inventory, and if inventory were very low, then that additional bucket might be utilized in almost every disaster. More beneficiaries would receive a bucket, and, as such, the objective function V OP T (χ) (with the dummy costs subtracted)
would most likely increase as well. It takes more time in aggregate to serve the beneficiaries, but only because the system is serving more of them. The magnitude of the dual variable would be comparable to the average time (cost) to ship a single item. If there were enough buckets in the system to serve the biggest disaster, then the dummy node is not being used at all, and an additional bucket might then reduce the overall time to serve beneficiaries from non-dummy nodes; π i would then be negative for the depots. The magnitude (absolute value) might be very low due to the fact that the additional unit is not utilized in most disasters.
To imagine how these dual variables might be used in practice, consider an operational manager who is deciding whether to add a bucket to the system. She can determine the effect this will have on fraction of demand served by looking at δ. The additional unit will alleviate a unit of unserved demand in (1-δ) of the disasters. If this compels the manager to add the unit, then the manager must decide where. The π i 's can be used to guide this decision. Assume the manager wants to add the unit to the depot that results in the smallest increase (or biggest decrease) in total time (cost) to serve beneficiaries. This can be approximated by the dual variables for each depot. Thus, she would add it to the depot with the smallest π i . Additionally, the dual variables may be utilized to make transhipment decisions. The operations manager might want to move a unit of inventory from the depot with the largest π i 1 to the depot with the smallest π i 2 . The estimated value of doing this is π i 1 − π i 2 . If the value of the transshipment exceeds the incurred cost, then the manager might shift inventory from depot i 1 to depot i 2 .
The adjusted dual variable (Π ) for the stochastic LP that optimally allocates inventory has similar properties as π i . However, we have not yet determined the best way to utilize or interpret this metric.
Data
The model described above requires data related to demand, supply, times and costs between nodes, and item-specific data such as weight and people-served per item. We gather these data from several distinct sources. We describe our assumptions and the limitations of the data to the best of our knowledge.
Disaster data
To generate disaster scenarios, we utilize historical data. As mentioned earlier, our focus is not on developing forecasting methods and thus we simply project a future that is similar to the past.
Specifically, we assume that each disaster recorded between 1990 until the summer of 2013 has an equal chance of occurring again, utilizing data from the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) (Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters 2014). This database keeps track of the following: the month and year of the disaster, the country, the type of disaster, and the total affected population (as well as other fields we do not utilize). We make several adjustments to and assumptions about these data for our analysis of disasters:
1. We use the capital city as the location for any disaster that occurred in a country.
The EM-DAT database does include some data indicating a more precise location, but this is a text description of where the disaster took place that might be blank or might be a partial list of provinces, for example. Instead of resorting to judgment to decipher locations from the few records with such descriptions, we used the geographic coordinates of country capitals for all historical disasters. From a logistical perspective, this assumption actually represents a more accurate network for many countries where the capital is a primary port of entry and/or regulatory hub (e.g. central medical stores) for imported supplies.
2. We use the "Total Affected" field to measure the number of people affected by a disaster. According to the EM-DAT database's website description, "Total Affected" is defined as the sum of "People suffering from physical injuries, trauma or an illness requiring medical treatment as a direct result of a disaster", "People needing immediate assistance for shelter", and "People requiring immediate assistance during a period of emergency; it can also include displaced or evacuated people," (Centre for
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters 2014). Although it can be argued that this field may be subject to more bias than "Number Killed," for instance (Peduzzi et al. 2009 ), we use it because it is a more accurate representation of the number of people that need supplies such as blankets, buckets, jerry cans, soap, kitchen kits, latrine plates, and mosquito nets (the items we evaluate). Additionally, only 20% of the records have null values for "Total Affected" as opposed to about 27% of null values in "Number Killed." We exclude records with null values for "Total Affected" in our study.
3. We examine only sudden onset disasters and epidemics. Specifically, we include:
earthquakes, epidemics, floods, mass movement dry, mass movement wet, storm, volcano, and wildfire. We exclude: complex disasters, droughts, extreme temperature disasters, industrial accidents, insect infestations, miscellaneous accidents, and transport accidents. by-month, we exclude these disasters.
Depot and warehouse data
Governmental and non-governmental organizations who choose to stockpile disaster relief supplies may utilize their own warehouses, regional warehouses run by local governments and other organizations, or the United Nations Humanitarian Responds Depots (UNHRDs). We utilize two sources of data to ascertain the actual amount of supplies at each warehouse. The first is the UNHRD web- If an organization houses an item in a UNHRD, it may show up in both databases. Thus, we merged them as follows. For each organization, for each item, we assume that the maximum of the UNHRD number of items and the OCHA number of items is the true number of items owned by that organization. Also through the data-cleaning process, we merged the names of items that were similar. For instance, a jerry can may be referred to as "Jerry can, collapsible,w/screw cap,10lt," "Jerry can, collapsible, 10 L with Tap cab," "Jerrycan 20 ltr," among other descriptions. We considered for jerry cans and buckets that they were all the same regardless of description or size.
We performed similar data-cleaning on the other items that we examine. Thus, a record consists of the organization, city, item name, and quantity. Additional data cleaning was required to match the names of the organizations among the two databases as well. See below in section 5.4.3 for more details on blankets.
Finally, we took steps to "merge" similar depots. For instance, a depot is listed in Kuala Lumpur as well as Subang. These locations are about a 30 minute drive from each other. Including both locations in our model resulted in different inventory allocations in Kuala Lumpur and Subang, even though the inventory in Malaysia stayed constant. Therefore, to make the model and results easier to interpret, we picked only one depot for each of the countries in our database, and reallocated all the inventory from the other depots on that country to the one warehouse. Specifically, we reallocated inventory from:
• Ottowa, Canada to Toronto, Canada
• Saint-Bueil, France to Roissy-en-France, France
• Kuala Lumpur to Subang
• Molde, Kapp, Kolbotn, and Trollasen, Norway to Oslo, Norway
• Lae, Papua New Guinea to Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea
• Barcelona, Spain to Madrid, Spain
• Gloucestershire, UK to Oxfordshire, UK
Time and cost data
As just outlined, we have determined the locations of the warehouses and disasters. We now describe how we calculate the distance, time, and cost from each warehouse to each disaster site. We calculate these for two modes of transportation: air and truck. We do not consider sea transportation as the study focuses on immediate deployment of the stockpile. As evident from the LP formulations, we assume the cost of transporting goods in linear in the number of units being transported. Thus, for each warehouse-disaster-mode triplet, we calculate the time and the cost-per-metric-ton-km for the route. This, paired with information on the weights of each item, allows us to calculate the cost of shipping a single unit on a specific route.
For air, we assume the time and cost are based solely on distance. In order to calculate the distance between a warehouse and a disaster, we assume that planes travel on a great circle around Article submitted to Journal for Peer Review the globe starting at the warehouse and landing in the capital city of the country in which the disaster took place.
For trucks, in order to calculate the distance and time between a warehouse and a disaster, we utilize Google's "Distance Matrix" API (application programming interface) (Google 2014 ). This provides the duration and distance between two points based on driving. Although we can prefer to not use ferries with this API, if a ferry route exists, it will return the distance using a ferry. If there is no way to drive between two points and no ferry exists, no result will be returned, and we assume air must be used. We believe this is reasonable because if a ferry route exists, organizations may use this route (or a similar one) to transfer goods via boat.
Having calculated the distance for truck and air, we then calculate the time and cost assuming there is a fixed and variable component. For cost, we assume that moving a ton of goods incurs 10USD per metric ton fixed cost via truck and 25USD per metric ton fixed cost via air. Additionally, we assume air incurs 0.50USD per metric ton per km while truck incurs 0.10USD per metric ton per km.
To calculate the time for air, we assume that airplanes used by these organizations travel at 600 km/hr and that there is a 6 hour fixed time component to secure an airplane. For truck, we utilize the Google API travel times for driving, if driving is possible. We exclude driving routes with a driving time greater than 100 hours, assuming that air is the only feasible mode for such warehouse-disaster arcs. Of the 7175 warehouse-disaster arcs, about 31% are drivable according to the Google API. Of this subset of drivable routes, 71% take less than 100 hours to traverse.
We approximated the above time and cost parameters based on data spanning numerous commercial and humanitarian projects conducted at the MIT Center for Transportation & Logistics and on conversations with humanitarian logisticians. As such, the parameters may vary among different organizations working in different contexts in different locations. Our goal is not to exactly measure the time and cost, but rather to develop values that are relatively precise among the different routes and modes to enable tactical decision making and that are normative to provide strategic insight.
Item specific data
We concentrate on seven specific items that are stored at depots: blankets, buckets, jerry cans, kitchen sets, latrine plates, mosquito nets, and soap. These non-food items (NFI) are among the most common items sent to disasters by organizations and consequently have higher inventory levels at depots. Additionally, these items are different from each other in a way that necessitates modeling them differently. The need for blankets in a country depends on that country's weather as well as the time of year the disaster occurred. We assume mosquito nets are required only in countries that experience malaria. The other five items may be needed in all disasters, regardless of location and time of year. For each of these items, we gather weight and cubic volume data as well as data related to how many beneficiaries each item can serve. We determined the need for mosquito nets within a country based on whether that country had risk for malaria. We consulted the CDC website (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2014) to determine which countries had any risk for malaria at all. We assume that if a country has at least a partial (or localized) risk, then mosquito nets are needed for any disaster that strikes in that country. Otherwise, no mosquito nets are needed for that country. We do not attempt to track each country's disaster month relative to the rainy/malaria season. We assume that the impact of any disaster is great enough and long-lasting enough that families will need mosquito nets at some point over the next year following a disaster, which will include the rainy season. half the people require one blanket and half require two.
We The dominant type of thermal blanket stored in humanitarian organizations' stockpiles are medium weight blankets (which we discuss further below). Using the above assumptions and facts, we regress number of medium blankets required in addition to basic clothing against temperature 
where (a) + ≡ max(a, 0). To obtain P eopleServedP erBlanket (the β parameter in our model), we take the inverse of N umBlanketsP erP erson. Note that P eopleServedP erBlanket is not linear in temperature. If N umBlanketsP erP erson = 0, we assume that no blankets are needed, and set the demand to zero.
The above equation is a function of the nightly low temperature. Because we defining demand at the country level, due to paucity of more specific location data, we assume that the nightly low temperature is the same across an entire country for the entire month. We captured the average low temperature by month for each country in our database by querying the website World Weather Online (2014). This website averages all the cities within a country for which it has data across all the years for which it has data. Thus, between the temperature data and equation 3, we can estimate the number of people served per blanket for any country for each month.
To determine how many blankets are available in the stockpile warehouses, we first need to determine the TOG of the different types of blankets that are stored. We concentrate only on thermal blankets, ignoring cotton blankets (which are sometimes deployed to warm weather disasters). 
Results
Having described the LP formulations in section 4.1, we utilize the data described in section 5 to report on the metrics outlined in section 4.2. We also report on the optimal allocation of inventory, and how this changes by month and by amount of inventory stored in the system. Unless stated otherwise explicitly, all results are calculated assuming that there is no delivery deadline, that is, θ = ∞. Additionally, unless otherwise noted, demand refers to number of units required, not the number of people requiring the units. Table 1 describes each item's ability to meet demand given the current on-hand inventory level.
Metrics regarding items' abilities to meet demand
These data could easily have been calculated knowing the on-hand inventory level for each item and the the size of each disaster in each scenario. That is, the results are agnostic to the allocation of demand across the locations.
We notice from table 1 that the fraction of demand served (γ) tends to be small, even when almost one million blankets are kept in inventory, and even when these blankets can cover all the demand in 96% of the disaster scenarios in our dataset. This is driven by several disasters whose reported "Total Affected Population" is in the hundreds of millions. The paramater γ can be susceptible to outliers, and as such, care must be taken in its interpretation. Also note that the 96% of disasters fully covered, many of them small, result in low average demand met compared with inventory levels. to convert item demand to people in need and people served using the β parameter. For all items except for blankets, the ratio of people demand to unit demand is identical regardless of the mix of disasters served. Blanket demand varies by disaster because a blanket may serve three people in a warmer climate and half of a person in a colder climate. Table 2 shows the connections between unit demand and people demand. Notice that people served per unit varies over all demand and met demand only for blankets, which is 1.7 and 3.2 respectively. This reflects the fact that the unmet demand tends to involve disasters in colder-than-average months and locations.
Metrics regarding quality of allocation of inventory
Part of the utility from the stochastic LP is derived from its ability to compare disaster response metrics for the current inventory level and allocation with other stockpile deployment strategies, including the optimal allocation for each inventory level. In this section, we report metrics derived from the stochastic LP, including ∆ (balance metric) and φ (average time/cost to ship).
Specifically, From these tables, one can easily check the quality of a given item deployment. For instance, relative to the optimal allocation, blankets seem to be the best allocated item for both time and
Article submitted to Journal for Peer Review cost, whereas jerry cans seem to be the worst allocated. Items are significantly more out of balance with respect to cost than time. Almost all of the items are transported by air when time is being minimized, whereas about 80% of the items are transported by air when cost is being minimized.
This makes sense because trucks are significantly cheaper than airplanes, and they will be used more often when cost is an important factor to consider. The resulting efficient frontier and the actual inventory allocation for blankets are presented in figure 1. One can see that the current inventory allocation is not pareto optimal: significant improvement may be possible be reallocating items in the network.. The system can maintain the same average time-to-respond while dramatically reducing costs. We note that the optimal solution in the figure for a given point corresponds to an inventory allocation as well as a specific air/truck mix. Thus, it is possible that for a given solution on the frontier, one depot is shipping some items by air and some by truck to the same disaster scenario. This might actually occur in an actual situation, as organizations send some units quickly to alleviate immediate needs, while trucking in the remainder in order to cut costs.
Allocation strategies
To explore allocation strategies, we focus in depth on one item: blankets. We examine the optimal allocation of blankets in the network as it varies with: value being optimized (time or cost), total inventory in the system, and time of year. We also report on the dual variables for the depots given the current allocation of blankets, which can help guide operations managers as to what transshipments may be worthwhile.
We first report how fraction of demand served (γ), fraction of disasters served completely (δ), and average time-to-serve (φ) vary as the inventory level is increased. In figure 2 , we chart how as more blankets are held in the system, more demand is met and more disasters are served completely. It is not surprising that fraction of disasters served grows more rapidly than fraction of demand met;
as discussed earlier, the magnitudes of very large disasters' unserved demands will affect fraction of demand met. We also observe that as more inventory is added to the system, the average time-torespond also decreases. It is clear from this chart that additional inventory can serve two purposes:
it can be available to serve more beneficiaries and it can reduce the overall time-to-respond (as well as the cost). The chart also provides intuition for decision makers in determining the "sweet spot" inventory level to meet their objectives. Figure 3 shows how the actual allocation of 852,563 blankets compares to the optimal allocation of blankets when both time and cost are optimized. The data supporting this as well as data for buckets and mosquito nets can be found in appendix B in tables 9, 10, and 11 respectively.
This figure suggests that inventory should be moved from Dubai and Ankara to Subang in order to minimize response time and costs. Optimally, it is better to have items in Ankara when minimizing time and in Warsaw when minimizing cost. Ankara is nearer to potential disaster locations via air transportation (based on our assumptions), while Warsaw is better connected to potential disaster locations via truck. to the actual total inventory level of blankets. As such, the allocation of items to warehouses along this dotted line matches the middle stacked bar in figure 3. We note in figure 4 that one is not necessarily decreasing the amount of inventory in (for instance) Ankara as the total inventory increases from about one million to fifty million. Rather, the proportion of inventory kept in Ankara reduces, even if the actual inventory stays constant or increases. This effect is especially pronounced because the x-axis uses a logarithmic scale.
One interesting thing is that Stockholm is a useful location to store blankets, even when minimizing time. This is due to the fact that because of flight paths on the spherical earth, Stockholm is nearer to disaster locations like China than other possible depots. In the scenario when one million blankets are kept in the system, it is optimal to keep about 3% of these blankets in Stockholm.
In the optimal solution, Stockholm serves disasters in China most often, followed by Mexico, and then Russia.
The optimal inventory allocation may also vary with month. There are two reasons. First, the regional prevelance of disasters changes by time of year. There is a hurricane season, a rainy season, a tornado season, and a wildfire season for certain locations. Second, for blankets specifically, as the temperature changes in different countries throughout the year, a different number of blankets is required per person in the same location depending on the time of year.
We present the optimal allocation of one million blankets across months when time is minimized in figure 5 . Figure 6 zooms in on depots where less inventory is allocated by showing the same data Article submitted to Journal for Peer Review in figure 5 , but with three primary depots excluded: Dubai, Subang, and Ankara. The optimal allocation for a given month is calculated by solving the stochastic LP including only demand for that month plus two months going forward. Thus, the optimal allocation for April includes disasters that occurred in April, May, and June, while the optimal allocation for December includes disasters occurring in December, January, and February. From these two figures we see that during summer, the model tends to keep blankets in Asia, specifically Subang. But also in the summer, Stockholm is an important depot (for reasons mentioned previously, namely, that flight paths from Stockholm to Asia are relatively short). As hurricane season picks up in the Caribbean in the fall, more inventory is allocation to Panama and Miami. As winter approaches, inventory is better positioned in Africa and Turkey.
Reporting on the actual inventory allocation versus the optimal inventory allocation though is not always helpful to practitioners. If much inventory exists in Panama, and the model states that "It is optimal to place it in Ankara," what are the consequences if the operations manager transships the inventory from Panama not to Ankara, but instead to Stockholm or Barcelona. The dual variables provide an estimate of the value of an additional unit of inventory in each location.
From this, one can estimate the value of transshiping between locations, or the cost of replenishing to one depot instead of another due to external considerations such as risk mitigation or political factors. Figure 7 shows the adjusted dual variables (π i ) returned by the optimization software. Blankets: Dual variables for depots for actual allocation while minimizing time and cost
We do not consider or address degeneracy, multiple optimal dual variables, or the validity of the duals beyond infinitesimal perturbations. The adjusted duals are estimates of the increase in time and cost in the objective function if an additional unit is place at the specific depot. They are often positive in the situations we have examined because the total time or total cost to serve might increase if a unit is added to the system, though this increase offers the benefit of serving more
Article submitted to Journal for Peer Review people. Subang and Jakarta stand out because when adding an item and serving more people the time and cost actually reduce respectively. This is a product of the fact that the actual inventory allocations are significantly suboptimal.
The usefulness of the dual variables is derived not necessarily from the specific values of these variables, but rather from the differences between them. For instance, according to figure 7 the best transshipment move with respect to time appears to be from Panama to Subang. The estimated value of moving one unit would be (0.35 − −0.03 =) 0.38 total hours. Recall that an additional unit may not be utilized in every disaster, and the the duals represent the value of an additional unit over all disaster scenarios, not the value conditional on it being used.
Consider an operations manager who wants to transship from Panama to Ankara, but cannot for some reason that the model cannot capture. Then, with respect to time, moving the units to Stockholm instead of Ankara might provide similar value because the associated dual values are similar. If the operations manager added units, then Subang would be the best place to minimize time, and Jakarta would be the best place to minimize cost. Thus, in this way, operations managers can make decisions using the dual variables as a guide. They offer an objective assessment when considering the many other factors in making decisions such as the political climate, incentives, risks, and others.
Delivery deadline cutoff times
The stochastic LP minimizes average time-to-respond. As such, responding to disaster A in 26 hours and disaster B in 7 hours (with an average response time of 16.5 hours) would be preferable to responding to both in 17 hours. In reality, the relationship between response time and benefit to the people affected by a disaster may be nonlinear. One can incorporate this in several ways, for instance, by including a nonlinear objective function, by minimizing the maximum response time, or by incorporating only disasters that can be served within a delivery deadline cutoff. While many researchers have studied the most appropriate nonlinear objective function, there is not consensus yet as to what the objective function should actually be. We felt that minimizing the maximum response time was not useful here because some remote disasters may be far away from all depots.
Instead, we explore the last option. We set a delivery deadline cutoff value between 6 and 72 hours.
All arcs in the network whose time-to-respond exceeds this cutoff are considered to be infeasible.
Note that because we have set air travel to have a six-hour fixed time to acquire the plane, only trucks can be used at a six hour cutoff in our model. Tables 5 and 6 show how the delivery deadline cutoff time affects how much demand can be served for the seven items in our dataset.
Not surprisingly, given the current allocation of inventory, very little demand can be satisfied in six hours (only trucks can be used in this time frame due to the assumptions in our model). By allocating the inventory optimally, one can dramatically increase (proportionally that is) the demand that can be served. By the 48 hour delivery deadline cutoff, every disaster can be served.
Based on our assumptions, the longest flight possible is about 33 hours. Including the fixed time, the longest flight is about 39 hours. Thus, the delivery deadline cutoff does not affect the number of people served when it is higher than 39 hours (although the cutoff value may still have an impact on average time-to-serve and cost-to-serve).
Figures 8, 9, and 10 show how demand served, cost/time per unit, and optimal allocation across the depots vary with delivery deadline cutoff respectively for blankets. One can see from figure 8 how more demand could be served sooner if inventory were reallocated. The space between the In figure 9 we show how cost-per-unit and time-per-unit vary with the delivery deadline cutoff given the optimal inventory allocation. We put the fraction of demand served in gray in this figure, which is the same information as in figure 8 . The cost-per-unit does not vary much whether cost is being minimized or time is being minimized. When the delivery deadline cutoff is small (under 9 hours), the cost is also small because the only short cheap arcs being used; and not very much of the demand is being met. As the delivery deadline cutoff increases, more demand is met and the cost increases. At about 30 hours, most of the demand is met. Increasing the time window beyond thirty hours allows inventory allocations that lead to lower costs as well as the utilization of cheaper arcs from the same depots (trucks instead of planes where possible).
We see a similar effect in the bottom plot of figure 9 where we report on the time-to-serve.
Similar to cost, the time-to-serve starts off small (because only short arcs are being utilized), then increases until about 30 hours, then decreases because inventory allocations that lead to quicker responses on average can be utilized. As the delivery deadline cutoff increases, the average timeto-serve increases significantly in the model where cost is being minimized. This is due to the fact that when cost is the objective trucks replace planes where possible with increasing deadline levels. 
Proposed index
We use the results of our empirical study to propose an initial Response Capacity Index (RCI)
that measures the quality of stock deployment in the global disaster response network. This RCI encompasses information on a variety of aspects that policy analysts and decision makers might want to consider with a single composite number. We first list attributes that are important to 1. Location of depots -Are the depots in the right places? That is, if the current inventory were allocated optimally across the currently available depots, how good is the response? We utilize "Optimal time to serve" to represent this attribute. This metric (described below in more detail) will reflect a faster (slower) response time if depots are located in more (less) useful cities.
2. Allocation of current inventory -Is the inventory in the system spread out among the current depots efficiently? For this attribute, we utilize the "Balance metric." This corresponds to two metrics because we consider both time as well as cost.
3. Amount of inventory -Is there enough inventory in the system? The metric "Fraction of disasters covered" captures this index attribute.
4. Quick response ability -Can the network response quickly to a significant portion of the affected population? The metric "Fraction of disasters covered within 12 hours" captures this attribute. Additionally, this metric captures information on the quality of the depot locations, the quality of the allocation of inventory, as well as information about the level of inventory.
For each of the seven items we analyze, we convert each of the five metrics into a scale from 0 to 10. The RCI for a specific item is calculated by taking a simple average of these five components.
We take this straightforward approach to normalizing the metrics for two reasons. First, rigorously determining appropriate weights for the metrics (that are not equal to 1/n) is beyond the scope of this paper. Second, a simple average is more accessible for users seeking to relate the RCI components to the single composite number. Other indices such as the National Health Security
Preparedness Index (NHSPI) utilize a similar approach. Specifically, the NHSPI also uses a 0 to 10 scale (as opposed to a 0 to 100 scale) in order to avoid the perception that the number is a percentage (Association for State and Territorial Health Officials and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2014)); the NHSPI also utilizes simple averages. We envision practitioners and policy-makers utilizing an item's RCI value to get an overall sense of the response capacity for the item and offering the opportunity to drill down to see the values of the individual attributes to quickly and easily see how the RCI value was calculated.
Each metric is scaled to be between 0 and 10, where 0 is the worst and 10 is the best. To do this requires that each component have a "best" possible value and a "worst" possible value to anchor the score. For instance, consider the metric φ OP Tτ : average time-to-serve if current inventory were optimally located throughout the system. The value for blankets is φ OP Tτ = 14.6. We consider the worst value to be 40 hours, the approximate longest flight possible between a warehouse and a disaster. We consider the best value to be 6 hours, the fixed time associated with a flight. Thus, we convert φ OP Tτ in this way: 10 − [(14.6 − 6)/(40 − 6) × 10] = 7.47. Whether a component is subtracted from 10 or not depends on whether "higher is better " for that component.
We list here the five metrics that make up the RCI, and our approximate "best" and "worst" values for each (knowing that with this information, one can calculate the scaled values based on tables 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6).
1. Average time-to-serve if inventory were optimally allocated (φ OP Tτ ) -This component measures the quality of the network structure as a whole as well as the quality of the total inventory level as it impacts time-to-serve. We choose the worst value to be 40. This is because the longest distance that might exist between a warehouse and a disaster location is 20,015km
(the radius of the earth times π). Based on our assumptions that airplanes travel at 600km/hr and that airplanes have a 6 hour fixed time associated with acquisition, when rounded up, this equates to 40 hours as the longest possible flight time. We consider the shortest possible time-to-respond to be 6 hours, which is equal to the airplane fixed time of acquisition. Based on our assumptions, trucks can actually respond quicker than this. However, based on our results when we optimize time, air is utilized 98%-100% of the time (see table 3 ).
Article submitted to Journal for Peer Review 2. Balance metric: time (∆) -This component measures, based on the network structure and total inventory level, how well allocated (or balanced) the current inventory is in the system versus the optimal with respect to time. Because it is a ratio of the objective value based on the actual allocation to the objective value based on the optimal allocation, the best possible value is 1. We consider the worst value to be 2. We chose the number 2 because it is a small integer that it easy to interpret and because of the items we tested, no balance metric for any item exceeded (or even approached) this value. In practice, it may be possible for an item's balance metric to exceed the number 2. In this case, we would scale any balance metrics greater than or equal to 2 to the value 0 on the 0 to 10 scale.
3. Balance metric: cost (∆) -This is calculated the same as for time.
Fraction of disasters completely served (δ) -This component measures how many disasters
can be served given the current inventory level. As mentioned above in section 4.2.2, this component is relatively robust to very large outlier disasters. The worst possible value is zero, while the best possible value is 1. Thus, we merely multiply the metric by 10.
5. Fraction of disasters completely served within 12 hours (δ 12 ) -This component reflects the fraction of disasters able to be completely served given time threshold θ = 12. We then multiply this value by 10 (since 0 is the lowest fraction of demand that can be served and 1 is the largest). We chose 12 hours because about half the disasters can be served at this time interval as compared to the number of disasters able to be served completely when no time constraint exists. Thus, it provides more insight -additional to insight provided by the non-time-constrained metric δ -into the quality of the network and inventory allocation as compared to other time thresholds; at 6 hours almost no disasters are covered and at 24 hours almost all disasters are covered that will eventually be covered. Table 7 shows the component and final RCI values for the seven items in our dataset. 
We make a few observations. The optimal time to serve does not vary much: this is because the depot locations are the same for all commodities. Only the total inventory amount changes across items in this analysis. In general, the more inventory the system has the more effectively it can spread it out and respond quickly. There is more variation for the cost balance metric than for the time balance metric: this is in part due to the fact that in order to minimize time, airplanes will be utilized more of the time. In this analysis, obtaining an airplane requires a fixed time of six hours which dampens differences among the actual flight times across commodities. The RCI as a whole scores blankets as the best and soap bars as the worst. Depending of the relative importance of these different items, decision makers might want to dive deeper into the data behind those commodities with low scores and possibly allocate more resources towards them. For instance, the soap's low RCI value is driven largely by the fact that there is not much soap in the system (compared to other commodities). While there are very many jerry cans in the system, it ranks in the middle behind kitchen sets and mosquito nets because these jerry cans are not allocated optimally across the network of depots.
Conclusion
By drawing on the techniques of the disaster pre-positioning literature and the intention of the economic index literature, we develop normalized, useful, objective metrics for the disaster response community. These metrics are based upon stochastic optimization models often used to decide inventory placement in disaster response scenarios. We use these metrics to report on the quality of inventory levels and allocations for seven items, utilizing recent data from the UN on inventory levels, from em-dat on disasters, and from other sources on commodity attributes and local temperatures. Five of these metrics were combined into our proposed Response Capacity Index (RCI).
From the metrics and the RCI, we communicate qualitatively where budgets might be allocated:
transfers of inventory from one depot to another, additional inventory in the system for specific items, or even more depots. Dual variables from the stochastic LP provide additional information to decision-makers as to where inventory transfers might be cost effective.
We also build intuition as to which depots are useful under which conditions; for instance, Dubai is a good central depot to use when one does not have much inventory; Stockholm is useful from April to August due to its relatively short flight paths to Asia; Miami and Panama are utilized more from October to February due to seasonal changes in disaster patterns such as hurricane season in the Caribbean; over the course of the year, inventory shifts from in general being in Asia between March and August to being in Anakara and Nairobi the rest of the year. This intuition can be utilized even as better and more recent data are collected to update the metrics and RCI.
Through these metrics and RCI, we hope to motivate the need for regular, rigorous assessment of stockpiles. We offer an analytical approach, based on optimal allocation deployed against a detailed Article submitted to Journal for Peer Review forecast. The inventory data are not completely current, but they are recent and demonstrate the opportunity to improve the response capacity of current investments by providing these regular, rigorous assessments. Deploying the current allocation of inventory across depots takes 14% longer and costs 29% more on average than the respective optimal allocations. Network-wide, bar soap has low inventory levels relative to demand, as compared to the six other items we analyze. By intelligently reallocating the inventory currently in the system, and by adding inventory to those commodities whose value to beneficiaries warrants it, decision-makers can improve the response capacity of the system.
One difficulty standing in the way of optimizing the system is the fact that currently there are many decision-makers; each organization (some governmental some not) decides where to put its inventory in isolation from the decisions of other organizations. This makes measuring response capacity and improving the system difficult. A first step, which we believe we have achieved with this research, is to point out the current state-of-the-system as a whole as well as point out opportunities that can be achieved if organizations do coordinate with each other more. For instance, figure   7 suggests that blankets be moved from Panama to Subang to save money and time. However, the inventory in Panama is owned not only by several different organizations, but also is owned by organizations different from those that own blanket inventory in Subang. Before coordination is embraced by organizations, it is helpful to point out opportunities and the value of working together.
Not only is it non-trivial for organizations to coordinate with each other; it also takes great effort to coordinate among NGOs, the private sector, governments, and donors. It is our intention that these metrics and RCI can be useful for community-wide assessment and coordination. Donors can see where their dollars will be most effective, and they can hold organizations accountable for efficiency. Humanitarian logisticians can better deploy stocks because they will know the overall value of inventory in each specific location. The discussions between logisticians and donors can be framed by the metrics and RCI for the purpose of working together to assess the capacity and to adjust investments and deployments dynamically. More organizations can easily be added to the models. For instance, oftentimes private industry makes commitments to supply commodities to the disaster community. Sometimes, instead of holding inventory themselves, organizations contract with private industry to supply a certain amount of inventory in the event of a disaster. These situations can easily be incorporated into the model, contingent on the data being available.
There are several useful ways to extend this work. First, we aim to engage the humanitarian community to gather more extensive and more current data. This data might include the following:
better estimates of inventory levels including contracts with private industry; better estimates of each country's capacity to respond to beneficiaries for each item in a disaster; and better estimates of delivery costs and times. Second, currently, we utilize past disaster data to forecast future needs. There may exist better forecasting methods, such as those used by the insurance sector to forecast future risk to property. Third, we might extend the research to consider multi-commodity assessment, incorporating further expert opinion regarding the priority and importance of each commodity. For instance, if latrine plates and soap bars both have low RCIs, what is the value to the beneficiaries of allocating an organization's resources towards one versus the other? Fourth, it could be enlightening to consider supplier capacity to replenish depots and/or delivery directly to the affected community. Because of the structure of the stochastic LP, it is natural to incorporate a supplier level in the network. For instance, if several NGOs have contracts with a single supplier whose capacity is below the sum of the contracted amounts of the NGOs, the model would highlight this. Fifth, currently for the RCI we take a simple average of the components of the index. More sophisticated methods exist. One could develop a more rigorous methodological basis for the index, incorporating expert opinion to scale and weight the components, consider further attributes, and leverage further empirical data for testing. Mosquito nets 
